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This paper provides model-based estimates of the value of oil in Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge (ANWR). The best estimate of economically recoverable oil in the federal portion of ANWR
is 7.06 billion barrels of oil, a quantity roughly equal to US consumption in 2005. The oil is worth
$374 billion ($2005), but would cost $123 billion to extract and bring to market. The difference, $251
billion, would generate social benefits through industry rents of $90 billion as well as state and federal
tax revenues of $37 billion and $124 billion, respectively. A contribution of the paper is the decomposition
of the benefits between industry rents and tax revenue for a range of price and quantity scenarios. But
drilling and development in ANWR would also bring about environmental costs. These costs would
consist largely of lost nonuse values for the protected status of ANWR's natural environment. Rather
than estimate these costs and conduct a benefit-cost analysis, we calculate the costs that would generate
a breakeven result. We find that the average breakeven willingness to accept compensation to allow
drilling in ANWR ranges from $582 to $1,782 per person, with a mean estimate of $1,141.
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To drill or not to drill? That has long been the question in Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
(ANWR). The rising price of oil, terrorism, turbulence in the Persian Gulf, and recent acts of Con-
gress have put ANWR on the political agenda once again. Oil prices have more than doubled in the 
last two years. Terrorist threats and the ongoing war in Iraq have heightened concern about our reli-
ance on imported oil from the Middle East. Recent hurricanes in the Gulf Coast have damaged infra-
structure and caused significant disruptions to domestic supplies. These trends, along with the Presi-
dent's support, have prompted recent measures in the House and Senate to permit drilling in ANWR. 
While these initiatives have failed to pass thus far, the question of whether to drill in ANWR remains 
open and contentious. 
Little gray area exists between opposing sides of the debate. Proponents see the main advan-
tages as a decrease in the price of oil and reduced reliance on foreign imports. These benefits, they 
argue, can be realized without adverse effects on the environment. Opponents assert that the amount 
of oil in ANWR is insufficient to bring about any real benefits beyond sizable profits to the oil indus-
try. More importantly, they argue, any benefits from drilling are not worth the cost of destroying one 
of the last great wilderness areas on the planet. 
ANWR today—like the spotted owl in the 1990s—has come to symbolize differing philoso-
phies about the right balance between the use of natural resources and environmental conservation. 
The symbolic importance of ANWR draws attention, but it does not foster reasoned debate. Advo-
cacy on either side of the issue is widespread, yet careful and balanced analysis is surprisingly ab-
sent. 
This paper draws on the best available information and provides original analysis. We ap-
proach the issue from an economic perspective. In the starkest sense, economic efficiency recom-
mends drilling if the benefits exceed the costs. But calculating the benefits and costs of drilling in  
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ANWR is not straightforward. The questions are big, and the information is highly uncertain. How 
much oil are we talking about? How much is the oil worth? What are the environmental impacts of 
drilling? How can we place a monetary value on the environment? And what problems might arise 
from putting a price on something that many people consider priceless? 
We address these questions here. Our best estimate of economically recoverable oil in the 
federal portion of ANWR is 7.06 billion barrels, a quantity roughly equal to US consumption in 
2005. The oil is worth $374 billion (2005$s), but would cost $123 billion to extract and bring to mar-
ket. The difference, $251 billion, would generate social benefits through industry rents of $90 billion, 
in addition to Alaska and federal tax revenues of $37 billion and $124 billion, respectively. While 
these are the best estimates based on recent oil prices, we also conduct a sensitivity analysis for a 
range of different price and quantity scenarios. While the environmental effects of drilling are uncer-
tain, the environmental costs would consist primarily of lost nonuse values for the protected status of 
ANWR's natural environment. While these costs are real and potentially large, the information neces-
sary to account for environmental damage with any reasonable degree of precision is not currently 
available. Vast uncertainty exists about what the actual impact of drilling would be, and surprisingly 
little research has been conducted to place an economic value on the potential environmental costs. 
Consequently, rather than estimate these costs and conduct a standard benefit-cost analysis, we calcu-
late the costs that would generate a breakeven result against the benefits. We find that the average 
breakeven willingness to accept compensation to allow drilling in ANWR ranges from $582 to 
$1,782 per person of voting age, with a mean estimate of $1,141. 
These results and others that follow provide useful benchmarks for economic analysis of the 
benefits and costs of drilling in ANWR. With regard to such policy questions, however, we are well 
aware that economics is not the only perspective that matters, and we readily discuss its limitations. 
At the same time, we argue that the economic perspective taken in this paper is central and that the 




In 1960, the year after Alaska became the 49th state, the federal government set aside 8.9 million 
acres to establish the Arctic National Wildlife Range. The area was located in the northeast corner of 
Alaska and extended from the state's northern coast to south of the Brooks Range mountains. The 
designation was intended to protect the area's unique wilderness, wildlife, and recreational values. 
Passage of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) in 1980 more than dou-
bled the size of the Range, adding 9.2 million acres and officially renaming it the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge. More importantly, ANILCA designated nearly all of the original land as part of the 
National Wilderness Preservation System—making it off-limits to development. 
The coastal plain area, consisting of 1.5 million acres, was an exception. Because of the po-
tential for vast oil and gas reserves in this area, Section 1002 of the Act called for further study of the 
oil and biological resources of the undesignated area, which is often referred to as simply the “1002 
Area.” The Act also closed the 1002 Area to oil and gas exploration and development unless author-
ized by a specific act of Congress. 
The 1002 Area has been the primary source of conflict in ANWR, but it is not the only part of 
the Refuge where development of oil and gas resources can occur. There are Native lands within 
ANWR, although their legal status is such that they can be developed only if Congress decides to 
develop the 1002 Area. The state of Alaska offshore areas, which are designated up to three miles off 
the coastal plain, could also be developed, and they are not subject to federal decision-making. 
Above ground, ANWR protects a broad spectrum of arctic and sub-arctic habitats that are, 
according to the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), “unparalleled in North America” (USFWS 2001). 
These habitats support a number of large animal species—including caribou, musk oxen, wolves, 
wolverines, and polar bears—and some 135 different bird species. The 1002 Area in particular is re-
garded as having the most productive and biologically important sections of the Refuge. These fea- 
4 
tures have lead observers to remark that ANWR is “America's Serengeti” and one of the “Last Great 
Wilderness Areas.” 
 
Oil in ANWR 
We begin the analysis with a fundamental question: How much oil are we talking about? Unfortu-
nately, determining the precise amount of oil in the ground is an impossible task. Oil will always ex-
ist in places we have yet to look, and oil that we know exists is often not recoverable, at least not yet. 
Much of the oil, if not most, is simply out of reach with existing technologies, and much of the oil we 
do know about is not profitable to recover. Yet, as oil becomes more scarce, its price will increase, 
and the result will be better technologies and an expansion of profitable reserves. This dynamic im-
plies that any estimate of oil reserves will certainly be wrong; it will change as time passes, markets 
adjust, and more information becomes available. We nevertheless need to start somewhere in ANWR. 
The most reliable and recent estimates come from a study conducted by the US Geological 
Survey (Attanasi 2005b). The study estimates the amount of ‘technically recoverable’ oil in the 1002 
Area, the area that we focus on and refer to simply as ANWR. Technically recoverable oil is defined 
as resources that can be recovered using current technologies without regard to cost. Recognizing 
inherent uncertainty, the study reports three estimates: a low estimate of 4.25 billion barrels of oil 
(BBO) with 95-percent certainty, a mean estimate of 7.69 BBO, and a high estimate of 11.80 BBO 
with 5-percent certainty. 
More importantly, the USGS study conducts an economic analysis to estimate the amount of 
‘economically recoverable’ oil. This is defined as the quantity of technically recoverable oil for 
which the costs of finding, developing, producing, and transporting the resource can be recovered 
with existing technologies. In addition to the explicit costs, the analysis accounts for a 12-percent 
required rate of return on capital as well as state and federal taxes. Using this information, the study 
derives long-run marginal costs curves for ANWR oil. Figure 1 shows the curves corresponding with  
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the three different levels of certainty: 95-percent certainty, a mean estimate, and 5-percent certainty. 
All three curves are time-independent, and their upward slope reflects the fact that marginal costs 
increase with each additional barrel. 
The marginal cost curves provide an estimate of the amount of economically recoverable oil 
at a given price. The assumption is that a barrel will be extracted as long as the price covers the mar-
ginal cost. The prices range from $17.66 to $58.85 in 2005 dollars, the year for which we report all 
monetary values in this paper. Note that for any given price, the estimate with 95-percent certainty is 
less than the mean estimate, and the mean estimate is less than the one with 5-percent certainty. It is 
also worth noting that, in all three cases, the marginal cost increases rapidly at the high end of the 
price range, and the quantity of oil begins to converge to the corresponding estimate of technically 
recoverable oil. 
In order to settle on a specific estimate of economically recoverable oil in ANWR, it is un-
avoidable for our analysis (or any other analysis for that matter) that we need to settle on a price. But 
oil prices are notoriously volatile. Between 1998 and 2005, the average price of Alaskan North Slope 
oil fluctuated between $15.17 and $53.21 per barrel. We base our estimates of economically recover-
able oil on the average price in 2005—that is, $53 per barrel.
1 
At this price, we interpolate between data points in the USGS study to derive 7.06 BBO as 
the mean estimate of economically recoverable oil. Of course, this estimate is sensitive to the as-
sumed price, but notice that quantity does not change very much with prices above $45 per barrel. 
The estimated quantity does change substantially, however, depending on the level of certainty one is 
willing to accept. At $53 per barrel, the estimates range from 3.83 BBO with 95-percent certainty to 
10.67 BBO with 5-percent certainty. In the analysis that follows, we focus on the mean estimate of 
                                                 
1 Economic theory suggests that the current price reflects the best estimate of the present value of future prices. Al-
though in June of 2006 the price reached $69.50, we use the average price in 2005 in order to avoid letting recent 
fluctuations have undue influence on the analysis. It is worth noting that the EIA (2007) estimate of the price of oil 
in 2030 is $59 in $2005s, which is very close to our base case here.  
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7.06 BBO as the “best” estimate, but frequently refer to the low- and high-certainty estimates as part 
of the sensitivity analysis. 
Let us now get some perspective on the best estimate of 7.06 BBO in ANWR. In 2005 proved 
reserves throughout the US (excluding ANWR) were 23.11 BBO (EIA 2006a), and this number is 
comparable to economically recoverable oil. Thus, for the mean scenario at a price of $53 per barrel, 
ANWR holds roughly 30.5 percent of the economically recoverable oil in the US. Also in 2005, US 
consumption was 7.5 BBO (EIA 2006c), and 65 percent of this demand, or 4.9 BBO, was supplied by 
imports (EIA 2006d). Of these imports, Persian Gulf countries supplied 16.9 percent, while other 
countries with substantial supplies were Canada (16.1%), Mexico (12.2%), and Venezuela (11.1%). 
It is interesting to note that the best estimate of 7.06 BBO in ANWR is very close to domestic 
consumption in 2005. But ANWR’s oil would not be available over such a short period of time. It 
would take many years before the first barrel could be recovered, and production is not forecasted to 
peak until 2025, with estimates of 0.9 million barrels per day (MBD) (EIA 2004). Also in 2025, do-
mestic production is forecasted to be 4.6 MBD. Thus, at its high, ANWR is forecasted to account for 
20 percent of domestic production. Finally, total supply in 2025, including imports, is forecasted to 
be 28.3 MBD, so ANWR at its peak is predicted to account for approximately 3.2 percent of domes-
tic oil consumption. 
 
The Benefits of Drilling 
As stated previously, two benefits of drilling in ANWR that are often put forth are a decrease in the 
price of oil and reduced reliance on foreign imports. The numbers above suggest, however, that nei-
ther of these benefits is likely to be consequential. Domestic oil prices are determined in a world 
market and would be unaffected by the relatively small annual flows from ANWR. Moreover, the 
quantity of oil in ANWR, 7.06 BBO, is merely 0.55 percent of the proven reserves worldwide (EIA 
2006b). Analysts also recognize that even if ANWR's supplies were large enough to affect world  
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prices, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) would countermand the increase 
in production and thereby negate any price effects (EIA 2004; Gelb 2005). It is also clear, with 
ANWR accounting for a maximum of 3.2 percent of domestic consumption in 2025, that something 
other than drilling in the Refuge will be necessary to substantially reduce our dependence on foreign 
oil.
2 
Another benefit that is sometimes mentioned is job creation. The extent to which drilling in 
ANWR would create new jobs depends on the macroeconomic level of unemployment in the US 
economy. With full employment, any job creation would come at the expense of an equal number of 
jobs lost elsewhere. This implies no net job creation for the nation as whole. It is also the case that 
any new jobs in ANWR would not persist in the long run, after the oil fields have been developed 
and the resource has been extracted. For these reasons, along with the fact that any employment 
benefits would be small compared to net benefits from the oil itself, we do not account for employ-
ment benefits. 
The benefits that would be real and substantial are the economic rents and tax revenues that 
would arise from drilling in ANWR. From a social perspective—the one used in benefit-cost analy-
sis—it is important to recognize that the oil is not worth the total revenue that it generates. There are 
opportunity costs associated with finding, developing, producing, and transporting the oil, along with 
the required rate of return on capital. The only portion of total revenue that would generate a benefit 
to society is the net return, which would consist of economic rent to the oil industry and state and 
federal tax revenues. 
We extend the USGS model (Attanasi 2005b) to estimate the economic rents and tax reve-
nues that would arise from ANWR oil. The first step of deriving an estimate of total revenue is 
straightforward. For any given price, we multiply the price times the quantity of oil indicated by the 
                                                 
2 The arguments made in this paragraph are similar those made by Cleveland and Kaufmann (2003). They argue that 
drilling in ANWR would not significantly increase US oil production, would not reduce OPEC’s influence, and 
would have a negligible impact on world oil markets.  
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long-run marginal cost curve in Figure 1. Using our best-estimate scenario of $53 per barrel and 7.06 
BBO, total revenue is $374.2 billion. Considering the 95-percent and 5-percent certainty scenarios, 
the estimate of total revenue ranges from $203.0 billion to $565.3 billion. Table 1 reports the esti-
mates of total revenue for the full range of prices evaluated under the three different scenarios. 
The next step is to estimate total costs excluding tax payments. Recall that the long-run mar-
ginal cost curve includes the explicit costs, a required 12-percent return on capital, and state and fed-
eral taxes. Each of these components—with the exception of the state and federal taxes—constitutes 
an opportunity cost. In order to estimate these costs, we need to recover the long-run marginal cost 
curve excluding state and federal taxes; we can then use the area under the curve to estimate total 
costs. While the Appendix provides details about our methods for accomplishing this, we report the 
results in Table 1 for the different prices and scenarios. For instance, at $53 per barrel, total costs un-
der the best-estimate scenario are $122.8 billion, and the high- and low-certainty estimates are $75.3 
billion and $172.1 billion, respectively. 
The final step is to derive net benefits, using the difference between total revenue and total 
costs. Our best estimate of the net benefits is $251.4 billion, which ranges from $127.7 billion to 
$393.2 billion in the low- and high-certainty scenarios. Readers should keep in mind that these esti-
mates consist of rents to the oil industry along with state and federal taxes, which are both considered 
economic surplus from a social benefit-cost perspective. Table 1 partitions the net benefits into indus-
try rents, state tax revenues, and federal tax revenues. Under current tax policy, our best estimates are 
industry rents of $90 billion, state of Alaska tax revenues of $36 billion, and federal tax revenues of 
$125 billion.
3 These estimates, partitioned in this way, are one of the main contributions of this paper. 
We are unaware of any other study that estimates these different categories of net benefits for a range 
of different prices and certainty scenarios. 
                                                 
3 These estimates do not account potential federal revenues for the sale of leasing rights. The Bureau of Land Man-
agement (2006) estimates that these revenues could account for $8 billion, which would be a transfer from industry 
rents to federal tax revenues.  
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A final remark about our estimates of the net benefits relates to discounting. Readers may 
question why we have not discounted the stream of benefits and costs, since oil extraction is fore-
casted to occur over several decades, and future streams of benefits and costs are typically discounted 
to reflect present values. Our reason is based on the simple fact that all of the preceding analysis is 
time-independent and already uses present values (in $2005s). Discounting is therefore unnecessary. 
Even though barrels of oil will be extracted at different points in time and differ in terms of their cur-
rent value net benefit, a no arbitrage condition implies that the best estimate of the present value of 
the overall stream of net benefits should equal the calculations made here. This argument is based on 
standard economic theory of nonrenewable resources when a particular resource owner in not large 
enough to affect world prices (Hotelling 1931). One implication is that regardless of the extraction 
path through time, the present value net benefits should be equal to the case in which all of the re-




We now turn to the environmental impacts of drilling in ANWR. Potential adverse effects on the en-
vironment stem from two principal sources: vehicular travel as part of seismic analyses, and infra-
structure for extracting and transporting oil. A thorough seismic analysis of ANWR would be carried 
out to obtain more accurate information about where oil is located and in what quantities. This proc-
ess requires the use of large, sound-wave emitting vehicles that must be driven over the landscape in 
a grid pattern, with lines spaced anywhere from four to one-half miles apart. While conducting the 
analysis during the winter can reduce impacts because of snow cover, it is impossible to eliminate all 
impacts, as snow depths in the region are highly variable and frequently shallow (USFWS 2001). 
                                                 
4 A scenario in which this reasoning would not hold is if there are unanticipated shocks to the demand for oil. This 
could occur, for example, if there are unexpected technology innovations in the renewable or non-fossil energy sec-
tors. Later in the paper we discuss such possibilities and show how they are not likely to affect our estimates in a 
substantial way.    
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The facilities and infrastructure associated with extracting and transporting oil include drill-
ing sites, roads, pipelines, and buildings to house and support workers. Such development directly 
alters the land upon which it is built. Fortunately, many impacts can be mitigated with improved 
technologies, such as slant-drilling, which makes it possible to reach more reservoirs with fewer 
wells. Yet some degree of impact is unavoidable. Of particular concern are the effects that roads and 
pipelines will have on animal populations. 
A significant amount of research has been conducted on the arctic ecosystems of ANWR, but 
there remains a great deal of uncertainty about how these systems operate and how susceptible they 
are to human disturbance. The US Fish and Wildlife Service (2001) reports that drilling in ANWR 
will have “major effects” on caribou and musk oxen as well as “moderate effects” on wolves, wol-
verines, polar bears, snow geese, seabirds and shorebirds, arctic grayling, and coastal fish. Unfortu-
nately, there are few precise estimates of how these populations would be affected, with the only ex-
ception being those for caribou. 
The Porcupine Caribou Herd is the most prominent and researched population in ANWR. 
Consisting of roughly 123,000 animals, the Herd travels north each summer to calve in the federal 
portion of ANWR, a nutrient-rich area that plays an important role in maintaining calf survival rates. 
Oil development may adversely impact this behavior. Research has found that female caribou with 
calves move at least 1.5 to 2 miles away from drilling infrastructure, such as roads and pipelines. 
Scientists predict that such deterrence in ANWR would adversely affect calf survival and population 
levels. Specifically, development in ANWR is predicted to displace the Porcupine Herd by thirty 
miles and reduce calf survival by 8.2 percent. Such a reduction is likely to reduce the Herd popula-
tion as a whole, as a 4.6-percent reduction in calf survival would be expected to halt population 
growth (Griffith et al. 2002). 
Less is known about the potential effects on other species, such as musk oxen, polar bears, 
and migratory snow geese. Of the estimated 700 musk oxen that live in the coastal region, approxi- 
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mately 250 inhabit ANWR, where they reside year-round. Oil development could reduce the popula-
tion of musk oxen due to dispersal and decreased calf production and survival (Reynolds et al. 2002), 
but precise estimates are nonexistent. There are an estimated 2,500 polar bears that live in and around 
ANWR and use the federal area primarily for winter denning when cubs are born. While oil devel-
opment could potentially impact this behavior, studies have shown that polar bear populations, in-
cluding those located near existing drilling areas, have grown over periods of petroleum development 
and are relatively unaffected by human disturbances (Amstrup 2002). Snow geese migrate to ANWR 
in the summer months when food supplies are not abundant in Canada. Research has shown that 
geese are most susceptible to disturbance from aircraft (Hupp et al. 2002), but estimates are not 
available for the impacts that might arise from new drilling and development in ANWR. 
Aside from direct effects on animal populations, oil spills are a concern. Even with the great-
est care and best technologies, development in ANWR might still result in accidental spills with ad-
verse effects on the environment. A recent spill near Prudhoe Bay provides an example. Despite 
monitoring systems in place to prevent spills, a leak occurred in a pipe leading to the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline System (TAPS) that went undetected for several days, spilling 267,000 gallons of crude oil 
(Barringer 2006). Other spills directly related to land transportation of Alaskan oil include 700,000 
gallons spilled when vandals destroyed a section of TAPS in 1978, and 285,000 gallons when a 
hunter shot the pipeline in 2001. Just as environmental assessments of TAPS have recognized and 
anticipated that oil spills happen and have consequences for environmental quality (BLM 2002), the 
same consideration is necessary when evaluating the environmental impacts of drilling in ANWR. 
Finally, another environmental concern that is sometimes raised is that ANWR oil will pro-
mote air-pollution and greenhouse-gas emissions. The argument is that oil consumption will increase, 
causing increased emissions with adverse effects on environmental quality, human health, and cli-
mate change. But this reasoning neglects the fact that demand for oil is met with supply from the 
world market, which is based on far greater reserves. Therefore, if demand is not met with ANWR  
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oil, it will be met with oil from somewhere else. For this reason we do not consider increased emis-
sions from the oil in ANWR to be an environmental impact of opening the area to development. 
 
The Environmental Costs of Drilling 
Despite uncertainty about the specific environmental consequences of drilling and development, it is 
certain that such activities would change the way many people think about ANWR. Even without oil 
spills or adverse effects on wildlife, many people would feel that something had been lost. The econ-
omist John Krutilla captured this idea in his influential 1967 paper Conservation Reconsidered: 
When the existence of a grand scenic wonder or a unique and fragile ecosystem is in-
volved, its preservation and continued availability are a significant part of the real in-
come of many individuals. These would be the spiritual descendants of John Muir, 
the present members of the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, National Wildlife 
Federation, Audubon Society and others to whom the loss of a species or the disfig-
urement of a scenic area causes acute distress and a sense of genuine relative impov-
erishment (p. 779). 
 
We believe this perspective—not any specific environmental impact—is what people care 
about most when it comes to the prospect of drilling in ANWR. To many people, regardless of 
whether or not they belong to an environmental organization, the notion of any development in one 
of the great remaining wilderness areas is the real cost of drilling in ANWR. From an economic per-
spective, the challenge is to put a value on such nonmarket costs. 
Nonmarket valuation has been the focus of a large literature in economics for several dec-
ades. The conceptual foundation comes from the observation that people may hold both “use” and 
“nonuse” values for environmental resources. Use values for ANWR come from on- and off-site ac-
tivities, ranging from hunting and bird-watching to viewing photographs and motion pictures. Be-
cause so few people visit ANWR due to its remote location, on-site use values are expected to be rel-
atively small. Other sources of use value may come from option and bequest motives. Option values 
arise from the desire to preserve the option to use a resource in the future. Bequest values arise from 
knowing that protection of ANWR today ensures benefits for future generations.  
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Nonuse values are different because they arise in the absence of any past, present, or future 
use. In other words, nonuse values—which are likely to be of far greater magnitude than use values 
for ANWR—must come from the satisfaction of simply knowing the Refuge exists in its protected 
state. As Krutilla (1967) also wrote, “there are many persons who obtain satisfaction from mere 
knowledge that part of the wilderness of North America remains even though they would be appalled 
by the prospect of being exposed to it” (p. 781). Hundreds of economic studies have demonstrated 
that people are in fact willing to pay a certain amount to ensure the continued existence of unique 
environmental resources, regardless of the fact that they may never personally use them. 
Because nonuse values are not observable through economic activity and are not measurable 
through market data, estimation requires the use of hypothetical markets that are constructed through 
surveys. The most common technique is contingent valuation, which typically asks people their will-
ingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) for a proposed policy or change in environ-
mental quality.
5 One of the most ambitious studies was conducted for the state of Alaska as part of 
the natural resource damage assessment following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1988 (Carson et al. 
2003). The study found that US households are willing to pay an average of $147 (adjusted to $2005) 
in a one-time payment to prevent an oil spill with damages like those that occurred in Prince Wil-
liams Sound, Alaska. Aggregating this up to the population as whole, it is estimated that the Valdez 
oil spill caused damages worth $10.87 billion. 
While it is natural to think about economic value in terms of WTP, the conceptually correct 
measure for the question of drilling in ANWR is WTA. US residents have an implicit property right 
over the status quo, so if ANWR were opened for drilling and development, we should think in terms 
of how much individuals would need to be compensated for the change in status (Freeman 1993). In 
other words, the question of interest is the following: What is the minimum amount that individuals 
                                                 
5 Although there is ongoing debate over the validity of contingent valuation for estimating nonuse values, the tech-
nique is generally accepted for use in natural resource damage assessment and benefit-cost analysis.  
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would be willing to accept in order to allow drilling and development in ANWR? The answer to this 
question is then interpreted by economists as the costs that would occur if drilling in ANWR were to 
actually take place. 
We are not aware of any study that uses a representative sample of the US population to esti-
mate WTA to allow (or even WTP to prevent) drilling and development in ANWR. As a result, no 
estimate of the social costs is available to compare with our estimates of the social benefits discussed 
above. We can nevertheless calculate the average WTA that would yield a breakeven result. In other 
words, we can calculate the average WTA that would yield a cost estimate of drilling that would ex-
actly offset the estimated benefits. This approach has long been recognized as a useful way to com-
pare benefits and costs of projects that are associated with environmental impacts that are difficult to 
quantify and value. When the approach is employed, Krutilla and Fisher (1975, p126) describe the 
key question: “Is the threshold value readily judged to be within the limit of reasonable expectation 
as to what the preservation benefits [avoided costs] might be—or, on the other hand, readily seen to 
be quite outside the limit that the preservation benefit [avoided cost] reasonably can be expected to 
be?”   
In order to calculate the breakeven WTA, we consider the relevant population to be US resi-
dents aged 18 or older in 2005, which the US Census estimates as 220,377,406 people. Dividing our 
best estimate of the oil benefits, $251.4 billion, by this population yields an average WTA of $1,141 
per person. Referring back to the low- and high-certainty scenarios, the estimated breakeven result 
ranges from $579 to $1,784. It is important to recognize that these estimates represent a one-time 
payment. We can, however, convert these WTA estimates into an annualized payment over 30 years, 
which is the duration over which ANWR oil would be expected to flow. This would yield a present 
value WTA of $38 per year, with a range between $19 and $59. 
With the best estimate we can make the following statement: If the average WTA for a one-
time payment to permit drilling and development in ANWR is $1,141 (or $38 per year for 30 years),  
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then the social costs will exactly equal the estimated benefits. If the true WTA falls short of this esti-
mate, then economic efficiency recommends drilling. Alternatively, if the true WTA is greater than 
the estimate, then economic efficiency recommends not drilling. The question, then, is whether the 
estimate falls within the reasonable expectation of what US citizens would be WTA in order to allow 
drilling in ANWR. 
 
Discussion 
The best estimate of economically recoverable oil in the federal portion of ANWR is roughly equal to 
US consumption in 2005. The net revenue of $251 billion would generate social benefits through in-
dustry rents of $90 billion, state of Alaska tax revenues of $36 billion, and federal tax revenues of 
$125 billion. But drilling and development in ANWR would also bring about environmental costs. 
These costs would consist largely of lost nonuse values, for which no reliable estimates currently ex-
ist. As an alternative, we calculate that an average WTA of $1,141 in a one-time payment (or $38 per 
year for 30 years) to allow drilling would produce a breakeven result in a benefit-cost analysis. 
To what extent might this result be an over- or under-estimate? While the result depends on 
key assumptions about future prices and the quantity of oil, such assumptions are necessitated by in-
herent uncertainty. While oil prices might be higher in the future, they might also be lower. More oil 
might lie beneath ANWR, but so might less. Other factors would have an unambiguous effect. The 
benefits would be greater if the federal decision to drill were to induce production in adjacent Native 
and state lands, which could increase the amount of economically recoverable oil up to 36 percent 
(Attanasi 2005a). In contrast, the benefits would be lower if some portion of the industry rents 
flowed to foreign oil companies and shareholders. There are also costs associated with deciding to 
drill now rather than postpone the irreversible decision until some point in the future, when more in-
formation will be available (Arrow and Fisher 1975).  
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How might the expansion of renewable and non-fossil energy sources and technologies affect 
the results? Significant technological innovation could increase the supply of alternative energy (e.g., 
wind, solar, or bio-fuels) or reduce the demand for fossil fuels through more efficient technologies 
(e.g., hybrid or hydrogen systems). As a result, oil prices and the benefits of drilling in ANWR would 
fall. Nevertheless, while strong growth of renewable sources is expected, the impact on demand for 
oil is likely to be small. Fossil fuels are projected to provide nearly the same share of total energy 
supply in 2030 as they do today (EIA 2007). Hence, without significant policy changes or unexpected 
technology breakthroughs, alternative energy and advanced technologies are unlikely to have an ap-
preciable impact on the price of oil over the time span considered in our analysis of ANWR. 
A potential concern about the implications of this paper—which is a common critique of the 
benefit-cost perspective—is that distributional issues are neglected. Benefit-cost analysis is based on 
economic efficiency and takes no account of where and to whom the benefits and costs occur. For 
example, our benefit calculations do not distinguish between rents to the oil industry and tax reve-
nues, as both are considered benefits to society. But policy-makers and citizens certainly care about 
how this surplus would be divided. Questions about whether any specific allocation is appropriate are 
certain to arise, especially in light of recent controversy in the US over whether royalty payments 
from the oil industry have been too low (Andrews 2006). Also of concern might be the distribution of 
benefits and costs between Alaska and the federal government. We discussed how employment ef-
fects would be negligible at the national level, but job creation would certainly occur in Alaska. 
We might also consider the question: How would the tax revenues be spent? By default, most 
of the revenue would support general fund expenditures such as social programs and homeland secu-
rity. Another possibility—which was the basis for a recent Senate proposal to provide relief from 
high fuel prices—is for direct cash transfers to US residents, as is currently done by the Alaska Per-
manent Fund Dividend Program. Our analysis illuminates just how large such transfer payments 
could possible be. Still another possibility is to earmark revenues to support conservation and envi- 
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ronmental programs. The state of Alaska already levies a conservation tax of five cents per barrel, 
much of which is used to fund oil-spill prevention and recovery. A more ambitious effort of this type 
might be a useful topic for political discussion. Consider a proposal in which substantial portions of 
the tax revenues from ANWR oil were dedicated to address broader environmental concerns on a na-
tional level—much could be accomplished with $161 billion. While such a policy would not affect 
the outcome of a narrowly defined benefit-cost analysis, it would certainly affect the way many peo-
ple think about the tradeoffs associated with drilling in ANWR. 
Finally, we recognize that a subset of the population is uncomfortable with the idea of mak-
ing any tradeoffs with the current, protected status of ANWR. From this point of view, the economic 
approach to decision-making may seem inappropriate. But we think the economic perspective has 
value because it forces people to recognize that tradeoffs are being made regardless of whether we 
decide to drill in ANWR or to maintain its protected status. Our aim in this paper has been to illumi-
nate these tradeoffs and help push the debate in a more reasoned and informed direction. Generally, 
we consider benefit-cost analysis to be a useful policy tool rather than a decision rule. As for policy 
in ANWR, the tool that we develop forces a question: How might the true willingness to accept com-
pensation to allow drilling compare to the estimates given here? We suspect opinions will differ vast-




The USGS report does not provide enough detail to directly recover the long-run marginal cost curve 
excluding state and federal taxes. The precise algorithms are not publicly available, and their dis-
semination and modification is not compatible with review protocols of the USGS. We can, however, 
derive a close approximation, and we describe our method here. 
The task is to derive a long-run marginal cost curve that does not include taxes. The taxes 
paid on any given barrel of oil include: federal royalties, state severance taxes, state and federal in-
come taxes, a conservation tax, and a state ad valorem tax. The study uses marginal tax rates based 
on existing policy in 2003. Federal royalties are assessed at 16.7 percent of gross revenue. The con-
servation surcharge is $0.05 per barrel. State and federal income taxes are assessed at 3 and 35 per-
cent of net income, respectively. 
The state severance tax and ad valorem tax are more difficult to infer. Severance tax rates are 
based on a complex function of field size and well productivity. The information necessary to calcu-
late severance taxes explicitly is not available; instead, we use the average tax rate of 9.9 percent of 
gross income less royalty payments (IOGCC 2002). There is also insufficient information to apply 
the ad valorem tax of 2 percent on the value of capital infrastructure. Because this tax is likely to be 
relatively small in the context of our entire analysis, we do not consider it. 
Let Z denote the marginal cost according to the USGS study. Then for the marginal barrel of 
oil, we know price P=Z. For the marginal barrel, the federal royalty payment is R=0.167Z. The state 
severance tax is S=.099(Z−R). Net income is defined as N=Z−R−S−C−0.05, where C is the marginal 
cost of finding, developing, producing, and transporting the oil, and 0.05 is the conservation sur-
charge. State income taxes are IS=.03N, and federal income taxes are IF=.35N. One simplification, 
which is necessary because of insufficient information about costs, is that we do not account for de-
preciation. Finally, the (after tax) 12-percent required rate of return is M=.12(R+IF+S+IS+C+0.05).  
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We use the identities above to solve for the long-run marginal costs, excluding tax payments. 
This involves solving for C+M=0684865Z−0.080642. For the values of P corresponding to data 
points in the USGS study, we have a mapping to the quantity of oil Q. Total revenue is then PQ. The 
difference between total revenue and the area under the marginal cost curve C+M, which we calcu-
late using a midpoint rectangular approximation, is the estimated social net benefit, which includes 
rents to the oil industry plus all tax revenue. 
We also decompose the tax revenue into state and federal taxes. The state tax for each barrel 
is S+IS+0.05, and the federal tax is R+IF. Both expressions are defined implicitly in the identities 
above. Note that the tax per barrel is not constant. At a given price P, the tax on inframarginal barrels 
will be greater because the marginal cost will be lower. In particular, the state and federal tax per bar-
rel will be a function of P and Z according to the following expressions: 
TS=0.0460806−0.0173317Z+0.104983P and TF=−0.0457258−0.202203Z+0.429687P. We calculate 
these taxes for the values of P corresponding with data points in the USGS study. We than estimate 
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Figure 1: Long-run marginal cost curves (source: Attanasi 2005b)  
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Table 1: Economically recoverable oil, total revenue, total costs, 
net benefits, rents, and tax revenues (billions of $2005s) 










Rents  State Federal 
19.3  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
22.5  0.75  16.85  11.18  5.67  0.22  1.52  3.93 
25.7  1.51  38.78  23.65  15.13  1.92  3.55  9.66 
28.9  2.33  67.31  38.90  28.41  4.81  6.20  17.41 
32.1  2.98  95.66  52.43  43.23  8.78  8.86  25.59 
35.3  3.22  113.70  57.95  55.75  13.42  10.63  31.70 
38.5  3.47  133.66  64.25  69.42  18.42  12.58  38.42 
41.7  3.55  148.14  66.44  81.70  23.66  14.04  43.99 
44.9  3.67  164.93  69.99  94.94  29.06  15.72  50.16 
48.2  3.74  180.08  72.22  107.86  34.59  17.26  56.01 
51.4  3.80  195.17  74.26  120.91  40.23  18.80  61.89 
53.0  3.83  202.99  75.33  127.66  43.14  19.59  64.93 
54.6  3.86  210.64  76.43  134.21  45.95  20.37  67.89 
57.8  3.90  225.34  77.96  147.38  51.75  21.87  73.76 
58.9  3.90  229.52  77.96  151.55  53.69  22.31  75.55 











Rents  State Federal 
19.3  1.40  26.96  18.10  8.86  0.19  2.44  6.23 
22.5  2.66  59.77  36.00  23.77  3.25  5.49  15.02 
25.7  4.72  121.21  69.80  51.41  8.80  11.19  31.42 
28.9  5.43  156.87  83.01  73.86  16.40  14.63  42.83 
32.1  6.07  194.85  96.33  98.52  25.00  18.31  55.21 
35.3  6.37  224.92  103.23  121.70  34.29  21.31  66.09 
38.5  6.60  254.23  109.02  145.21  43.98  24.25  76.97 
41.7  6.77  282.51  113.68  168.83  53.97  27.11  87.74 
44.9  6.92  310.98  118.12  192.86  64.20  30.00  98.66 
48.2  6.97  335.61  119.71  215.89  74.58  32.54  108.77 
51.4  7.03  361.06  121.75  239.31  85.03  35.17  119.11 
53.0  7.06  374.18  122.82  251.36  90.41  36.52  124.43 
54.6  7.09  386.90  123.92  262.98  95.58  37.83  129.57 
57.8  7.12  411.39  125.08  286.32  106.19  40.37  139.75 
58.9  7.14  420.19  125.87  294.32  109.74  41.28  143.30 
        










Rents  State Federal 
19.3  3.14  60.48  39.44  21.03  1.24  5.50  14.29 
22.5  5.95  133.70  79.37  54.32  8.10  12.32  33.91 
25.7  8.06  206.98  113.99  92.99  18.60  19.24  55.15 
28.9  8.98  259.43  131.11  128.32  31.34  24.35  72.62 
32.1  9.69  311.05  145.88  165.17  45.30  29.43  90.43 
35.3  10.01  353.45  153.24  200.21  60.02  33.72  106.48 
38.5  10.15  390.98  156.77  234.21  75.08  37.57  121.56 
41.7  10.38  433.16  163.07  270.09  90.42  41.85  137.82 
44.9  10.50  471.87  166.62  305.25  106.01  45.83  153.40 
48.2  10.58  509.43  169.17  340.26  121.76  49.72  168.79 
51.4  10.65  546.98  171.55  375.44  137.62  53.60  184.22 
53.0  10.67  565.25  172.08  393.16  145.75  55.51  191.91 
54.6  10.68  582.81  172.63  410.18  153.55  57.34  199.29 
57.8  10.71  618.82  173.78  445.04  169.52  61.09  214.43 
58.9  10.74  632.05  174.98  457.07  174.86  62.45  219.76 
Note: Numbers in bold, corresponding with the price of $53, represent the best-estimate scenario discussed in the text.  
 